Cook County Tries to Derail Supreme Court AR-15 Ban Case, but Its Own Brief Undermines the Argument

By Duncan Johnson Editor in Chief •
AR-15 Rifle. IMG Duncan Johnson
Cook County’s attempt to dismiss its Supreme Court rifle ban case centers on the distinction between AR-15-pattern rifles and the AK-based IMI Galil. IMG Duncan Johnson

Cook County, Illinois, is attempting to get its AR-15 ban case dismissed just weeks before the U.S. Supreme Court hears arguments that could determine whether governments can prohibit Americans from possessing commonly owned semiautomatic rifles. However, the county’s latest legal maneuver has exposed an apparent contradiction in its own Supreme Court filings. After previously grouping AR-15s and AK-47-style rifles together when defending its firearm restrictions, Cook County is now arguing that the differences between those platforms could prevent the remaining plaintiffs from challenging the ban.

On November 5, Cook County filed a Suggestion of Mootness in Viramontes v. Cook County, No. 25-238, asking the justices to dismiss the case following a request by lead petitioner Cutberto Viramontes to withdraw from the litigation. The county contends that his departure would leave the remaining challengers without standing to pursue the specific constitutional question before the Court. Yet, as Second Amendment attorney Stephen Halbrook explained in a November 8 analysis published by Reason, Cook County’s own description of the prohibited firearms complicates its latest argument.

Cook County Seeks Dismissal Ahead of Supreme Court Arguments

The procedural dispute began October 29, when Viramontes filed a motion under Supreme Court Rule 46.2 requesting his dismissal as an individual petitioner. The filing did not explain why he wanted to withdraw, but it specifically stated that no other petitioner was seeking dismissal and that the litigation remained pending as to the remaining parties. Cook County responded by arguing that Viramontes’ departure would eliminate the necessary legal basis for continuing its portion of the case.

The county’s argument centers on the firearms sought by the two individual petitioners. Viramontes wanted to purchase a Smith & Wesson M&P15, a conventional AR-15-pattern semiautomatic rifle, while Christopher Khaya, the remaining individual petitioner, wants to own an Israeli-made IMI Galil. Although the Galil is also a semiautomatic rifle, its design is largely based on the AK-47 platform rather than the AR-15. Cook County is using that distinction to argue that Khaya lacks a sufficient personal stake in the particular question the Supreme Court agreed to decide.

The county also questions whether the existing record establishes that Khaya’s desired rifle is commonly possessed for lawful purposes and whether his stated interest in recreational shooting supports the constitutional claim presented. These arguments are part of Cook County’s attempt to establish that the remaining challengers cannot satisfy Article III standing requirements. They are not findings made by the Supreme Court, which has yet to rule on the county’s request.

Cook County’s Own Brief Creates a Problem

The most revealing aspect of the dispute comes from Cook County’s earlier arguments defending its firearm restrictions. In its October 27 corrected merits brief, the county identifies several prohibited rifle designs, including the AK-47 and AR-15, before collectively referring to them as “AR-15 platform weapons.” That terminology appears on page 8 of the brief and demonstrates how broadly the county previously characterized the firearms covered by its restrictions.

Halbrook points to that language as a significant weakness in Cook County’s latest position. When defending its ban, the county treated multiple semiautomatic rifle designs as belonging to the same broad category. Now, when attempting to avoid Supreme Court review, it emphasizes the mechanical differences between an AR-15 and Khaya’s AK-based Galil. The county cannot erase that earlier characterization simply because a narrower definition might now serve its procedural argument.

There are legitimate mechanical differences between these platforms. The AR-15 generally uses a rotating bolt and direct-gas or piston-operated system, depending on the model, while the Galil uses a long-stroke gas-piston action derived from the Kalashnikov design. Those differences are familiar to knowledgeable gun owners, but they do not change the fact that both are semiautomatic rifles, and both fall within the broader category of firearms targeted by Cook County’s restrictions.

More importantly, the question accepted for Supreme Court review is not limited exclusively to AR-15-pattern rifles. The justices agreed to consider whether the Second and Fourteenth Amendments protect the possession of “AR-15 platform and similar semiautomatic rifles.” That broader language is central to Halbrook’s argument that Khaya retains standing to challenge the county’s prohibition. Although the county’s earlier terminology does not independently settle the jurisdictional issue, it provides a substantial reason to question the narrow distinction Cook County now seeks to establish.

The litigation also includes the Firearms Policy Coalition and Second Amendment Foundation, which remain petitioners despite Viramontes’ requested withdrawal. Cook County challenges whether those organizations can independently maintain the lawsuit, making the dispute about more than the ownership preferences of one remaining individual plaintiff. Ultimately, the justices must determine whether the remaining parties satisfy the constitutional requirements for continuing the case.

The Supreme Court’s AR-15 Ban Challenge Remains Alive

Even if Cook County succeeds in having its portion of the litigation dismissed, the larger constitutional challenge will remain before the Supreme Court. On June 30, 2026, the justices consolidated Viramontes v. Cook County, No. 25-238, with Grant v. Higgins, No. 25-566, which challenges Connecticut’s restrictions on commonly owned semiautomatic rifles. Both cases present the Court with an opportunity to address whether governments can prohibit firearms that millions of law-abiding Americans possess for lawful purposes.

Cook County itself acknowledges that distinction in a footnote to its November 5 filing. The county concedes that dismissing its case would not prevent the Supreme Court from addressing the underlying constitutional question through Grant. In other words, the county’s attempt to escape review of its own ordinance would not eliminate the broader legal battle over bans on AR-15s and similar semiautomatic rifles.

According to the Supreme Court docket, oral arguments remain scheduled for December 2, 2026. The Court has not granted Cook County’s request to dismiss the case, and on November 9, the justices granted the U.S. Solicitor General’s request to participate in oral arguments. The consolidated litigation therefore continues toward a major constitutional showdown, even as Cook County attempts to resolve its own case through a procedural argument.

The Second Amendment Does Not Depend on a Rifle’s Brand or Platform

The underlying constitutional dispute reaches far beyond the mechanical differences between an AR-15 and an IMI Galil. In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court recognized that the Second Amendment protects arms commonly possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes. The Court subsequently reinforced the historical framework for evaluating firearms restrictions in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, requiring the government to justify restrictions through the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.

The petitioners contend that bans on AR-15s and similar semiautomatic rifles violate those constitutional protections because the prohibited firearms are commonly owned and used for lawful activities, including self-defense, recreation, and competitive shooting. Cook County maintains that its restrictions are constitutional and argues that the prohibited rifles present dangers that justify regulation. The Supreme Court will now have an opportunity to examine those competing legal positions and determine whether such prohibitions can survive constitutional scrutiny.

For Second Amendment supporters, the county’s latest filing illustrates how the definitions used to defend firearm bans can become considerably narrower when the same government seeks to avoid a constitutional challenge. Cook County previously grouped several rifle platforms together to justify restricting them, yet now relies on distinctions between those platforms to argue that one of the remaining petitioners cannot challenge the prohibition.

Whether that argument succeeds remains for the Supreme Court to decide. Regardless, the larger question remains firmly before the justices as December 2 approaches: whether the Second Amendment permits governments to ban commonly owned semiautomatic rifles simply because officials object to their design or features.

Related: New Survey Finds 60 Million AR-Style Rifles as Supreme Court Weighs AR-15 Bans


About Duncan Johnson:

Duncan Johnson is a lifelong firearms enthusiast and unwavering defender of the Second Amendment—where “shall not be infringed” means exactly what it says. A graduate of George Mason University, he enjoys competing in local USPSA and multi-gun competitions whenever he’s not covering the latest in gun rights and firearm policy. Duncan is a regular contributor and editor-in-chief for AmmoLand News and is responsible for AmmoLand’s daily gun-rights reporting and industry coverage.Duncan Johnson