Federal Judge Refuses to End Florida’s 3-Day Gun Waiting Period Despite State’s Concession, Invites Brady and Giffords Into the Case

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TAMPA, FL — A federal judge on Wednesday refused to enter a judgment that would have ended Florida’s three-day waiting period on firearm purchases, even though the state officials being sued had already agreed to it. U.S. District Judge Steven D. Merryday denied the parties’ joint motion and instead invited the Governor of Florida, both chambers of the Florida Legislature, the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence, and the Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence into the case.

I previously covered how Florida Agrees to Kill Its 3-Day Gun Waiting Period, Concedes It Violates the Second Amendment. That agreement has now hit a wall. Judge Merryday ruled that the two sides cannot use a settlement procedure to get a federal court to strike down part of Florida’s constitution when nobody is arguing the other side.

The case is Dunn v. Glass, filed in the Middle District of Florida. The plaintiffs are four Florida residents who buy firearms at retail, two retail firearms businesses, and a national association the order describes as “devoted to protecting the right to keep and bear arms.” They sued FDLE Commissioner Mark Glass, the Attorney General of Florida, and all twenty of Florida’s state attorneys. The suit challenges the mandatory three-day wait “between the purchase and delivery of a firearm” in Article I, Section 8 of the Florida Constitution and the statute that carries it out, Section 790.0655.

On June 5, 2026, the defendants served the plaintiffs with an offer of judgment under Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That rule lets one side formally propose the terms on which a case ends. The plaintiffs accepted the same day. On June 30, both sides jointly asked the court to enter a judgment that would:

• Declare that the challenged Florida laws violate the Second Amendment “to the extent those laws require retailers to hold a firearm beyond the time required to perform a background check.”
• Permanently bar the defendants from enforcing those laws to that extent. The defendants would also have to notify state agencies and law enforcement within seven days.
• Award the plaintiffs $10,000 in attorney fees and costs, with no damages.

The parties argued the judge had no say in the matter. They relied on Collar v. Abalux, Inc., a 2018 Eleventh Circuit decision describing the clerk’s entry of a Rule 68 judgment as a “ministerial act,” meaning a paperwork step with no room for judicial discretion. Judge Merryday disagreed. He wrote that Rule 68 is normally “a simple, mechanical, and efficient tool” for “routine litigation.” This deal asked for a declaratory judgment, a formal ruling that a law is unconstitutional, and a permanent injunction, a court order barring Florida’s top law enforcement officials from enforcing part of the state constitution.

His first reason was the lack of a real fight. Citing United States v. Windsor, he wrote that federal courts need “concrete adverseness,” meaning two sides genuinely arguing against each other, before deciding a constitutional question that could invalidate state law. He pointed out that the docket shows no motion to dismiss, no motion for summary judgment, and no discussion of the merits beyond the complaint. “The absence of adversarial presentations is striking,” he wrote, quoting an earlier order in the case.

He also faulted both sides for not acknowledging how other federal appeals courts have split on waiting periods. The Tenth Circuit in Ortega v. Grisham (2025) discussed a seven-day waiting period unfavorably. The First Circuit in Beckwith v. Frey (2026) upheld Maine’s three-day wait, and on Oct. 19, 2026, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in that case, meaning it declined to hear the appeal.

His second reason went to the remedy itself. Blocking enforcement of a state law under the Fourteenth Amendment requires the court to first find that the Fourteenth Amendment has been violated. The order calls that “a power unavailable to the parties under any circumstances.” In his words, “by an arcane deployment of Rule 68, the parties attempt to secure two things, neither of which is available in the present posture of this action.”

The judge denied the joint motion and directed the clerk not to enter the judgment. He then set a schedule for amici curiae, or “friends of the court,” which are outside parties allowed to file briefs in a case they are not part of. The Governor, the Florida House, the Florida Senate, Brady, and Giffords must file a notice by Nov. 30, 2026, if they choose to participate. Anyone else who wants in must ask the court for permission by the same date. Amicus briefs, capped at 25 pages, are due Feb. 1, 2027. The plaintiffs and defendants may each file a 25-page brief by Feb. 19, 2027.

More from USA Carry:

• Florida Agrees to Kill Its 3-Day Gun Waiting Period, Concedes It Violates the Second Amendment
• New Mexico Argued a Federal Judge Did Not Have to Follow the Appeals Court. He Blocked the State’s Gun Waiting Period Anyway
• Federal Judge Still Thinks New Mexico’s Seven-Day Gun Waiting Period Is Constitutional. He Blocked It Anyway Because the Tenth Circuit Tied His Hands.
• Federal Judge Refuses to Block Maryland’s Glock Ban, Ruling the State Can Regulate ‘Excessively Dangerous Weapons’
• Ohio Supreme Court Rules State Judges Can Restore Gun Rights Despite Federal Ban

No judgment or injunction has been entered, so nothing in this order blocks enforcement of Florida’s waiting period. A case both sides wanted closed in June now has a briefing schedule running into late February, with two gun control groups invited into a fight Florida’s own officials offered to concede.

I will continue tracking Dunn v. Glass as the amicus deadlines approach.

Read the original story: Federal Judge Refuses to End Florida’s 3-Day Gun Waiting Period Despite State’s Concession, Invites Brady and Giffords Into the Case