Third Circuit Rejects Lifetime Gun Ban Over Decades-Old DUI Conviction
Edward Williams spent nine years fighting the federal government for the right to keep a firearm to defend himself and his family. His disqualifying offense was a Pennsylvania DUI conviction from 2005.
On October 13, the full U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that the government could not constitutionally continue disarming him. The 8–6 decision in Williams v. Attorney General rejects the idea that a conviction carrying a sufficiently long possible sentence automatically gives Washington authority to strip a person of Second Amendment rights for life.
A companion ruling, United States v. Bost, upheld a firearm conviction tied to an earlier conviction for violent threats. Together, the decisions strengthen constitutional challenges to automatic disarmament while leaving a fundamental question unresolved: How does an offense committed decades ago justify a lifetime prohibition after punishment is complete?
A State Misdemeanor Became a Lifetime Gun Ban
Williams’s case illustrates how broadly the federal prohibition reaches. His 2005 DUI conviction followed an earlier DUI offense and involved a blood alcohol concentration of at least 0.16%. Pennsylvania classified the offense as a misdemeanor, but its maximum possible five-year sentence triggered 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
The federal restriction turns on the possible punishment, rather than simply the state’s label or the sentence actually imposed. Williams received a sentence of ninety days to two years, with the custodial portion served at home.
According to the majority, Williams relinquished his firearms after his attorney advised him in 2015 that the conviction prohibited possession. He filed his constitutional challenge in 2017.
Writing for the court, Judge Paul Matey opened by recognizing the Second Amendment’s purpose:
“The Second Amendment is a primary protection against tyranny, a strong bulwark securing American liberty, and an indispensable means of defending the public good.”
That understanding requires government to justify restrictions through constitutional text and historical tradition. Legislators cannot settle the question merely by assigning an offense a particular sentencing range. 2026.10.13_140_OPINION
The ruling builds on the court’s Range precedent protecting a man with a nonviolent food-stamp-fraud conviction, a fight AmmoLand has previously covered.
Historical Restrictions Did Not Justify Williams’s Continued Disarmament
The Justice Department relied on historical laws addressing habitual drunkenness. But the court found those analogues insufficient to justify keeping Williams disarmed. Many involved confinement or guardianship for limited periods. They did not establish a tradition of continuing to deny firearm rights after an individual’s release and reintegration into society.
The record also showed that Williams had gone more than twenty years without violent conduct, maintained employment at the same job for more than three decades, and undergone an expert examination finding no addiction or violent tendencies. Nothing suggested he had dangerously misused firearms.
The government had failed to establish the historical justification needed for its restriction. The court affirmed Williams’s victory rather than sending him back for another round of factfinding. In his analysis on X, Second Amendment Foundation Director of Legal Research and Education Kostas Moros highlighted the duration issue, explaining that historical restrictions addressing drunkenness were not lifetime gun-possession bans. He identified that distinction as an argument advanced in the amicus brief his side submitted.
This was one of the main arguments in our amicus brief too: while there were certainly laws in the past allowing drunkards to be disarmed, they were not lifetime bans on gun possession.
That is the closest analogue and is directly on point, and there is no need for a more general “nuanced approach” here.
— Kostas Moros (@MorosKostas) October 13, 2026
The majority also rejected a standard allowing government to disarm people simply because officials consider them irresponsible:
“We find no history that supports disarming irresponsible people, where ‘responsible’ is defined by the whim of the sovereign or the will of the majority.”
Bost Leaves the Lifetime-Ban Question Unresolved
The court upheld Bost’s firearm conviction by a 12–2 vote, but the disagreement over its reasoning exposes a major unresolved problem with lifetime gun bans.
Judge Stephanos Bibas’s principal opinion identified two historical approaches to disarmament: individualized judicial findings that someone threatened physical violence, and restrictions targeting groups considered disloyal or dangerous to the political community. The court concluded that Bost’s 2002 conviction for terroristic threats supplied a sufficient basis for disarming him.
But the duration of those historical restrictions matters. Surety requirements and restraints addressing individual threats were temporary. Many group-based restrictions could also be lifted when the perceived threat ended or the individual demonstrated loyalty. Those examples do not automatically establish a tradition of permanently disarming Americans after they have completed their punishment.
That is the strongest constitutional argument in Bost’s favor, and one Kostas Moros emphasized in his analysis: the conviction was more than twenty years old. The question is whether that past offense can justify continuing to deny an enumerated right for the rest of someone’s life.
Judge Peter Phipps, joined by Judge Emil Bove, dissented on precisely that ground. They found no historical analogue supporting the presumptively permanent disarmament of people who have completed their punishment and returned to society. The majority upheld Bost’s conviction but left unresolved what later showing could overcome the presumption that his old conviction justifies continued disarmament.
That dispute deserves continued scrutiny. A historical basis for addressing a present threat does not, by itself, answer how long government may deprive someone of an enumerated right.
Constitutional Relief Cannot Wait on Government Promises
Both decisions also preserved access to judicial relief despite the revived federal rights-restoration process under § 925(c).
Bost did not have to obtain administrative permission before presenting a constitutional defense. The Williams majority likewise refused to postpone its duty based on promises about future administrative relief, although several separate opinions favored requiring exhaustion in future civil cases.
These were individual constitutional challenges; the court did not erase § 922(g)(1) nationwide. Williams nevertheless secured an important victory against automatic, continuing disarmament.
Government does not own the right to armed self-defense. It bears the burden of justifying its restrictions, including their duration. A conviction label cannot replace that constitutional obligation, and a discretionary restoration program cannot excuse courts from enforcing the Bill of Rights.
About Duncan Johnson:
Duncan Johnson is a lifelong firearms enthusiast and unwavering defender of the Second Amendment—where “shall not be infringed” means exactly what it says. A graduate of George Mason University, he enjoys competing in local USPSA and multi-gun competitions whenever he’s not covering the latest in gun rights and firearm policy. Duncan is a regular contributor and editor-in-chief for AmmoLand News and is responsible for AmmoLand’s daily gun-rights reporting and industry coverage.